Delivering images to customers they usually make
$ docker-compose up -d
to deploy those in production. It is easy to get root and to see / modify all file quite easy:
$ docker-compose exec <service> /bin/sh
/bin/sh(root)# ...
How can I avoid for customers to get full access rights to all files as root when running the container. Maybe this is not possible at all in Docker but then it should at least be more complicated for users to get full access to anything inside the container.
Is there a best practice to intrdoce non root accounts in containers?
You can’t. You can always run
docker exec -u 0 (container ID) sh
to get a root shell. (Assuming the image has a shell, but almost all do.)
Also remember that anyone who can run any docker command can edit any file on the host, and from there can trivially become root, and can prod around in /var/lib/docker to their heart’s content.
It’s generally considered good practice to set containers to run as non-root by RUN adduser to create a user using the base distribution’s tools and then a Dockerfile USER directive, but an operator can override this at runtime if they really want to.
Related
I am trying to generate a docker image from Ubuntu 18.04.
To administrate the container I am creating a default user :
# set default user
RUN useradd -m docker && echo "docker:docker" | chpasswd && adduser docker sudo
USER docker
My problem is I would like to set a secured password on it, and my dockerfile is intended to be versioned with Git.
So my question is : is there a way to load variables in dockerfile from a .env file or anything else ?
I have seen an option on the docker run command, but not for the docker build, am I wrong ?
Anything you write in the Dockerfile can be trivially retrieved in plain text with docker history. Any file in the image can be very easily retrieved by anyone who can run any docker command. There is no way around either limitation.
Do NOT try to set user passwords for your Docker images like this. In most cases it shouldn't be necessary to formally "log in" to a container at all. Let the container run the single application process it needs to run, and don't try to set up an ssh daemon, sudo, or other things you'd have in a more complete server environment.
(You shouldn't usually need a shell inside a container; you don't for other kinds of processes like your Nginx server, for example. If you do, you can get one with docker exec, and if your main process runs as a non-root user, you can add a -u root option to be root in that shell. Again, you can't prevent an end user from being able to do this.)
If you are using a standalone container, then you can use a script with the variables and run docker RUN, or ENTRYPOINT to run the script. This would contain your password information, and then you can carry on with the build of your image.
If you are using Docker Swarm, you can use secrets, more information on the following link, and differences if you are using Windows or Linux are explained as well.
https://docs.docker.com/engine/swarm/secrets/
I currently run the official Tensorflow Docker Container (GPU) with Nvidia-Docker:
https://hub.docker.com/r/tensorflow/tensorflow/
https://gcr.io/tensorflow/tensorflow/
However, I can't find a way to set a default user for the container. The default user for this container is "root", which is dangerous in term of security and problematic because it gives root access to the shared folders.
Let's say my host machine run with the user "CNNareCute", is there any way to launch my containers with the same user ?
Docker containers by default run as root. You can override the user by passing --user <user> to docker run command. Note however this might be problematic in case the container process needs root access inside the container.
The security concern you mention is handled in docker using User Namespaces. Usernamespaces basically map users in the container to a different pool of users on the host. Thus you can map the root user inside the container to a normal user on the host and the security concern should be mitigated.
AFAIK, docker images run by default as root. This means that any Dockerfile using the image as a base, doesn't have to jump through hoops to modify it. You could carry out user modification in a Dockerfile - same way you would on any other linux box which would give you the configuration you need.
You won't be able to use users (dynamically) from your host in the containers without creating them in the container first - and they will be in effect separate users of the same name.
You can run commands and ssh into containers as a specific user provided it exists on the container. For example, a PHP application needing commands run that retain www-data privileges, would be run as follows:
docker exec --user www-data application_container_1 sh -c "php something"
So in short, you can set up whatever users you like and use them to run scripts but the default will be root and it will exist unless you remove it which may also have repercussions...
I have a docker-based build environment - in order to build my project, I run a docker container with the --volume parameter, so it can access my project directory and build it.
The problem is that the files created by the container cannot be deleted by the host machine. The only workaround I currently have is to start an interactive container with the directory mounted and delete it.
Bottom line question: It is possible to make docker write to the mounted area files with permissions such that the host can later delete them?
This has less to do with Docker and more to do with basic Unix file permissions. Your docker containers are running as root, which means any files created by the container are owned by root on your host. You fix this the way you fix any other file permission problem, by either (a) ensuring that that the files/directories are created with your user id or (b) ensuring that permissions allow you do delete the files even if they're not owned by you or (c) using elevated privileges (e.g., sudo rm ...) to delete the files.
Depending on what you're doing, option (a) may be easy. If you can run the contanier as a non-root user, e.g:
docker run -u $UID -v $HOME/output:/some/container/path ...
...then everything will Just Work, because the files will be created with your userid.
If the container must run as root initially, you may be able to take care of root actions in your ENTRYPOINT or CMD script, and then switch to another uid to run the main application. To do this, you would need to pass your user id into the container (e.g., as an environment variable), and then later use something like runuser to switch to the new userid:
exec runuser -u $TARGE_UID /some/command
If neither of the above is an option, then sudo rm -rf mydirectory should work just as well as spinning up an interactive container.
If you need your build artifacts just to put them to the docker image on the next stage then it is probably worth to use multi-stage build option.
When I run a container as a normal user I can map and modify directories owned by root on my host filesystem. This seems to be a big security hole. For example I can do the following:
$ docker run -it --rm -v /bin:/tmp/a debian
root#14da9657acc7:/# cd /tmp/a
root#f2547c755c14:/tmp/a# mv df df.orig
root#f2547c755c14:/tmp/a# cp ls df
root#f2547c755c14:/tmp/a# exit
Now my host filesystem will execute the ls command when df is typed (mostly harmless example). I cannot believe that this is the desired behavior, but it is happening in my system (debian stretch). The docker command has normal permissions (755, not setuid).
What am I missing?
Maybe it is good to clarify a bit more. I am not at the moment interested in what the container itself does or can do, nor am I concerned with the root access inside the container.
Rather I notice that anyone on my system that can run a docker container can use it to gain root access to my host system and read/write as root whatever they want: effectively giving all users root access. That is obviously not what I want. How to prevent this?
There are many Docker security features available to help with Docker security issues. The specific one that will help you is User Namespaces.
Basically you need to enable User Namespaces on the host machine with the Docker daemon stopped beforehand:
dockerd --userns-remap=default &
Note this will forbid the container from running in privileged mode (a good thing from a security standpoint) and restart the Docker daemon (it should be stopped before performing this command). When you enter the Docker container, you can restrict it to the current non-privileged user:
docker run -it --rm -v /bin:/tmp/a --user UID:GID debian
Regardless, try to enter the Docker container afterwards with your default command of
docker run -it --rm -v /bin:/tmp/a debian
If you attempt to manipulate the host filesystem that was mapped into a Docker volume (in this case /bin) where files and directories are owned by root, then you will receive a Permission denied error. This proves that User Namespaces provide the security functionality you are looking for.
I recommend going through the Docker lab on this security feature at https://github.com/docker/labs/tree/master/security/userns. I have done all of the labs and opened Issues and PRs there to ensure the integrity of the labs there and can vouch for them.
Access to run docker commands on a host is access to root on that host. This is the design of the tool since the functionality to mount filesystems and isolate an application requires root capabilities on linux. The security vulnerability here is any sysadmin that grants access to users to run docker commands that they wouldn't otherwise trust with root access on that host. Adding users to the docker group should therefore be done with care.
I still see Docker as a security improvement when used correctly, since applications run inside a container are restricted from what they can do to the host. The ability to cause damage is given with explicit options to running the container, like mounting the root filesystem as a rw volume, direct access to devices, or adding capabilities to root that permit escaping the namespace. Barring the explicit creation of those security holes, an application run inside a container has much less access than it would if it was run outside of the container.
If you still want to try locking down users with access to docker, there are some additional security features. User namespacing is one of those which prevents root inside of the container from having root access on the host. There's also interlock which allows you to limit the commands available per user.
You're missing that containers run as uid 0 internally by default. So this is expected. If you want to restrict the permission more inside the container, build it with a USER statement in Dockerfile. This will setuid to the named user at runtime, instead of running as root.
Note that the uid of this user it not necessarily predictable, as it is assigned inside the image you build, and it won't necessarily map to anything on the outside system. However, the point is, it won't be root.
Refer to Dockerfile reference for more information.
Docker kind of always had a USER command to run a process as a specific user, but in general a lot of things had to run as ROOT.
I have seen a lot of images that use an ENTRYPOINT with gosu to de-elevate the process to run.
I'm still a bit confused about the need for gosu. Shouldn't USER be enough?
I know quite a bit has changed in terms of security with Docker 1.10, but I'm still not clear about the recommended way to run a process in a docker container.
Can someone explain when I would use gosu vs. USER?
Thanks
EDIT:
The Docker best practice guide is not very clear: It says if the process can run without priviledges, use USER, if you need sudo, you might want to use gosu.
That is confusing because one can install all sorts of things as ROOT in the Dockerfile, then create a user and give it proper privileges, then finally switch to that user and run the CMD as that user.
So why would we need sudo or gosu then?
Dockerfiles are for creating images. I see gosu as more useful as part of a container initialization when you can no longer change users between run commands in your Dockerfile.
After the image is created, something like gosu allows you to drop root permissions at the end of your entrypoint inside of a container. You may initially need root access to do some initialization steps (fixing uid's, host mounted volume permissions, etc). Then once initialized, you run the final service without root privileges and as pid 1 to handle signals cleanly.
Edit:
Here's a simple example of using gosu in an image for docker and jenkins: https://github.com/bmitch3020/jenkins-docker
The entrypoint.sh looks up the gid of the /var/lib/docker.sock file and updates the gid of the docker user inside the container to match. This allows the image to be ported to other docker hosts where the gid on the host may differ. Changing the group requires root access inside the container. Had I used USER jenkins in the dockerfile, I would be stuck with the gid of the docker group as defined in the image which wouldn't work if it doesn't match that of the docker host it's running on. But root access can be dropped when running the app which is where gosu comes in.
At the end of the script, the exec call prevents the shell from forking gosu, and instead it replaces pid 1 with that process. Gosu in turn does the same, switching the uid and then exec'ing the jenkins process so that it takes over as pid 1. This allows signals to be handled correctly which would otherwise be ignored by a shell as pid 1.
I am using gosu and entrypoint.sh because I want the user in the container to have the same UID as the user that created the container.
Docker Volumes and Permissions.
The purpose of the container I am creating is for development. I need to build for linux but I still want all the connivence of local (OS X) editing, tools, etc. My keeping the UIDs the same inside and outside the container it keeps the file ownership a lot more sane and prevents some errors (container user cannot edit files in mounted volume, etc)
Advantage of using gosu is also signal handling. You may trap for instance SIGHUP for reloading the process as you would normally achieve via systemctl reload <process> or such.