OAuth2 app with Touch ID - oauth-2.0

Is there any way that a third-party app can logically use Touch ID to authenticate to a web service that uses OAuth2?
Say I own a web service that requires authentication using OAuth2. It supports both the implicit and authorization-code grants (although I could add support for other grants if necessary).
A third party has a mobile app that uses this web service. It opens a native web view to authenticate, and loads my auth URL in it. The user enters their username/password on my domain, and I return an OAuth token back to the app.
If this app wants to implement Touch ID to speed up authentication, is there a way to do it that makes sense with OAuth2?
My understanding is that the purpose of the OAuth2 implicit and auth-code grants is to prevent the parent app from having access to the user's credentials. It only gets access to the resulting OAuth token, and that's only valid for a limited time.
With Touch ID, you would typically store the password using Keychain Services. So this obviously requires you to have access to the password.
I suppose they could store the OAuth token in the keychain instead of the password, but then this would only be valid for a short time.

The only answer I've come up with so far is what you allude to at the end: store the OAuth tokens -- but also a long-lived refresh token. How long that refresh token can live is definitely dependent on your specific security needs.

I don't know about any standard flow yet but here are some common considerations. Simply storing long-term credentials (passwords or refresh tokens, even encrypted at rest) would be mixing up security contexts in a way that is hard to audit. When using any local authentication (app-specific unlock PIN, any biometrics, or simply system unlock) it's important to do it in a way that can be verified by the server. So the first step would be device authentication, every instance of your app should use unique client id/client credentials (I suggest to implement Dynamic Client Registration Protocol to help with that but there could be other options). Then, it's a good idea to generate some piece of verifiable key information directly on the device, put it into secure storage (protected by whatever local unlocking mechanism and invalidated whenever biometrics changes or) and use it to generate a MAC of some kind, for example a JWT as a part of jwt-bearer flow (or some new extension to OAuth assertion framework). JWT tokens could include additional metadata (claims) that can provide more context to the server, like it can make informed decisions to force re-authentication in some cases.
To restate:
Device is authorized and issued an unique client credentials pair.
Locally-generated key is saved to the encrypted storage and protected by some local unlock mechanism (system lockscreen, PIN, biometrics, etc.)
The key gets registered with the server and tied to the device.
On unlocking the key is used to generate a JWT that is used as assertion for authenticating with the server.
Seems pretty standard to me, maybe someone should write up a BCP for this after thinking through all the implementation details, current practice, and security considerations.

Related

Oauth pkce flow impersonating someone else's client

For confidential clients, there are scopes assigned to clients and the logged in user has to consent to them. Since there is client secret involved in exchange of auth code for access token, no one can impersonate them and take advantage of their scopes.
But when it comes to pkce flow on a native app, if I had someone else's clientId (clientIds are not considered private information) which has a lot of scopes, I could just start the flow with with their clientId. What is stopping a hacker from using some reputed clientId in the PKCE flow and have access to all their scopes?
NATIVE CALLBACK METHODS
If you look at RFC8252, certain types of callback URL can be registered by more than one app, meaning only a client ID needs to be stolen in order to impersonate a real app, as you say.
This still requires a malicious app to trick the user to sign in before tokens can be retrieved. And of course each app should use only the scopes it needs, and prefer readonly ones. After that it depends on the type of native app.
MOBILE
A mobile app can use Claimed HTTPS Schemes via an https callback URL to overcome this. It is backed by App Links on Android or Universal Links on iOS. Even if a malicious app uses the client ID, it cannot receive the login response with the authorization code, because it will be received on a URL like this, and the mobile OS will only pass this to the app that has proved ownership of the domain via the deep linking rehistration process:
https://mobile.mycompany.com/callback?code=xxx
DESKTOP
For desktop apps there are gaps, since only Loopback and Private URI Scheme callback URLs can be used. It relies on users to avoid installing malicious apps. Eg only install apps from stores that require code signing, which also inform the user who the publisher is. If users install malicious apps then perhaps they have deeper problems.
ATTESTATION
A newer technique is to use a form of client authentication before authentication begins. For confidential clients, Pushed Authorization Requests are used, which uses the app's client credential, so this cannot be used by native clients by default.
Mobile apps could potentially provide proof of ownership of their Google / Apple signing keys during authentication, and there is a proposed standard around that.

How to authenticate mobile app to web service using Azure AD?

Currently I have this setup:
At login, and in every subsequent request after login, a mobile application that I have built uses Basic Authentication to authenticate the user with a web service that serves the app with information it requests.
On every request the Authorization header is inspected, the password and username are extracted from the header, the password is hashed using a proprietary DLL (so the web service doesn't actually contain the hashing algorithm) and compared to the hashed password associated with the username that is stored in the database.
I have now been asked to include Azure AD SSO in the login options.
After reading much about the topic, this looks seems to me like the setup:
I'm curious about a few things:
Is this setup correct, more or less?
Does the app send the Identity Token to the web service? If so, how does the webservice validate that token?
Is it correct that the webservice can match the Azure Identity to the DB user using one of the claims in the Security Token?
Where do Access Token fit in this picture?
Thanks for the help!
(Side Note: I know that Basic Authentication is not the preferred way to go in the first scenario. This was a temporary decision till we developed the token handling code, it only works using HTTPS and this is an internal application - you wouldn't be able to activate the app unless you have a code we give you)
I have little experience in azure ad but I think we could talk about your case.
First, whatever id token and access token are both jwt token, so to your web service application, you need to use jwt decode library to decrypt the token and get claims it contains. Here we need to know the difference between id token and access token, and I think you'll know that for your web service application, if it's more likely to play the role of an api application, you need to use access token because this token also contains user information. Then you need to add code in your program to decode the token and check if it's a 'valid' token for the request.(Because you've used azure ad to achieve the login part, you don't need to use your custom login part.)
Next, the signing in feature provided by azure ad requires to use account and password in the tenant which azure ad belongs to, the user accounts may look like xx#xx.onmicrosoft.com, it doesn't required to keep sycn with the accounts in your database, so it's difficult and needless for you to compare the user name obtained from the decoded token with those in your database. Because when your web service received the token(id or access token), that means someone has passed the authentication from azure ad. The token contains user information including role, expired time etc. You need to check if the token has expired and if has the correct scope. (Let's see a common situation, microsoft provides many graph apis to call, when accessing these api, we need to provide access token in request head with matching scope, e.g. https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me
requires a delegated api permission of User.Read)
To sum up here, if your web service just required the users in your database to sign in then can be access, id token and access token are both suitable for you because they both contains user name like 'xx#xx.onmicrosoft.com', what you need to do is decode the token and check if the token has expired and whether this user exists in your database(you may set up a mapping between them).

Can I use a client side login for OAuth Authorization Code Flow?

All OAutt Authorization code flow examples I've seen sends the user to a specific login page provided by the IDP Server (Identity Provider Server).
https://auth0.com/docs/flows/authorization-code-flow-with-proof-key-for-code-exchange-pkce
I'm wondering can the login page be on the client itself, as in through an APP or SPA? Or is this something unsecure which I am not aware off. Thank
Usually it is standard to redirect as you say, but security also depends on the credential being used:
If a user is signing in via their Google password then your app should definitely never see the credentials and you should always redirect
If the user is signed in via a password stored at Company X, to only access data stored at Company X, and the password is not used for any other purposes, then it is less bad, since the company owns all of the assets involved
People who avoid redirecting usually end up using a deprecated flow such as Resource Owner Password Grant. I would avoid that, since it will not fare well in security reviews and restricts your future authentication options.
To be on the safe side I would recommend sticking to the redirect model, and using a login method provided by the Identity Management System vendor.
FUTURE DIRECTION
Interestingly, there is an emerging trend from some vendors to remain within the app when that makes sense. See the Hypermedia Authentication API, which may become a standard. A key characteristic of this is that the Authorization Server continues to govern security and tell the app what to do.

How a mobile app will refresh access_token without refresh_token ? Implicit grant/ OAuth 2

As said in OAuth2 rfc6749
The implicit grant type is used to obtain access tokens (it does not
support the issuance of refresh tokens) and is optimized for public
clients known to operate a particular redirection URI. These clients
are typically implemented in a browser using a scripting language
Refresh tokens are not suitable for implicit grant.
My question is:
How a mobile app, will refresh the access_token once it expires?
How the big ones in the market are doing this? Which practices they follow?
I know it is not following security recomendations, but it´s a good practice to make an long-lived access_token in this case? It can get annoying to need to re-authenticate each 30 min you use an app, or you close and reopen it.
As necessary permissions don´t change, a silent log-in on every app start, will be a choice to consider?
You don't necessarily need a refresh token to allow continued usage once an access token expires. If you must insist your clients use the implicit flow, then they may be able to make use of cookies and redirects to keep getting short-lived tokens without user interaction. Providing your client apps are using an HTTP agent which can use permanent cookies. e.g. apps that run in a web browser.
The key then is keeping the user signed into the identity provider the first time the token is requested.
This is done for example by the Identity provider (you I guess?) creating an HTTP cookie for the user agent to persist. Most big identity providers will do this - i.e. keep you signed in.
Now, when the token expires your client app will send the user back through the Oauth process again but, because the user has remained logged in to the identity provider, the identity provider can authenticate the user from the cookie without prompting for credentials.
If your clients instigate this token renewal on a background thread they can request the token as normal and, through the magic of HTTP redirects and cookies, get back a new token from you with no user action required.
Again - this alternative to refresh tokens relies on the client device being able to utilise permanent cookies, and your users remaining signed in and your auth server handling http cookies. If your clients are using native apps this solution may not work.
As in the future you will have 100s of clients maybe your auth plaform should offer different auth flows to different clients.
This article on mobile apps and implicit flow may be of interest to you.
Native apps are supposed to use the Auth code grant. So you can use refresh tokens. There is an RFC that discusses reasons (mainly security) for that as well as platform specific details. There is an important implication - the /token endpoint of your OAuth2 provider should not require authentication for getting tokens, because your application cannot keep its client secret safe.

Use password credential flow and some 3rd party authorization server

This is more of a general question but I hope it is still valid for SO.
So far I have learned, that in general, a mobile app (such as official Pinterest app) use the Password credential flow to let their users login and access the API directly. (let's just assume they use OAuth for this)
So they collect username and password, send it to their server and get a token in return which is used for subsequent requests.
Now a user did not want to register and created an account using e.g. Facebook as the authorization server. So my question is:
How is this flow implemented?
My educated guess:
User chooses "Login with Facebook" in mobile app
Facebook Login Page opens with return_uri = mobile app
Mobile app receives auth token
Mobile app uses client credentials and says the API: Use this token for user X
Is this correct?
First of all, apps should not use the Password Credentials Grant. The specification is rather clear about it:
In the traditional client-server authentication model, the client
requests an access-restricted resource (protected resource) on the
server by authenticating with the server using the resource owner's
credentials. In order to provide third-party applications access to
restricted resources, the resource owner shares its credentials with
the third party. This creates several problems and limitations
The specification then goes on describing those problems.
And about the Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant:
The authorization server should take special care when enabling this grant type and only allow it when other flows are not viable.
The entire purpose of OAuth 2.0, I to not have to use something like the Password Credentials Grant, where the user hands over their password to the application.
About your second question: what happens when a user does not want to register and create an account with your app, but wants to use e.g. Facebook for authentication?
Remember that both the Implicit Grant, as well as the Authorization Code Grant, work by using a browser control to authenticate the user. In that browser session with the Authorization Server, you are free to authenticate your user in any which way you want. Certainly, you can use your own user/password database, but you could also use other mechanisms, such as WS-Federation. In your case, it sounds like the user want to authenticate using Facebook.
Authenticating using Facebook is then not done by your client app, but by your Authorization Server. It typically does that by using the Facebook Authorization Code Grant, followed by a call to read the user's profile to obtain their Facebook user id, name, and so on.
If you do not want to build such an Authorization server yourself, you can use an existing one. Several companies offer login-as-a-service solutions, including the one I work for.
UPDATE: You asked several follow up questions in a comment below. I'll answer them briefly here:
First of all, the fact that some companies that use OAuth to secure their services allow for a Password Credentials Grant, does not imply that you should. In fact, there are probably more examples of companies that don't offer this possibility, than companies that do.
There are real trust issues, and real security risks with sharing your password with a device app. To start with, the app on the device is easier to hack than a server. Furthermore, if you give the app your password, presumably that app also needs to store it somewhere for future use. As a user, I just have to hope that that storage is safe form possible malware running on my machine. For more issues, see the introduction in the OAuth 2.0 specification mentioned above.
Secondly, all good Authorization Servers differentiate between First Party Clients and Third Party Clients. A First Party Client such as yours is controlled by the same company that controls the Authorization Server, and for such an app the Authorization Server does not ask for user permission to share data, since it makes no sense to talk about sharing data with yourself. That is why the web sites of these companies don't ask you whether you allow to share the data they hold on your behalf with them. They already have it, and there is no "sharing" going on.
Of course, you might argue that you have never seen any of these companies talking about this distinction between First Party Clients and Third Party Clients. But the reason they don't should be obvious: when you deal with them, you are always a Third Party App. They don't need to tell you that they treat themselves differently.
The mechanism I would choose in your scenario depends on the nature of the client app, and the nature of the services it accesses. What are your requirements?
Anyway, if the device the application is running on has a secure storage facility, such as Windows Phone 8.1, I would probably consider using the Authorization Code Grant without client credentials. That way, the user never has to log in again. If we're talking about a web site or a SPA, I would consider the Implicit Grant (where the "remember me" feature, if any, is offered by the Authorization Server). Again, the specification gives advantages and disadvantages of each grant type for several scenario's.

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