How is a Cookie validated internally by ASP.NET MVC using CookieAuthenticationMiddleware - asp.net-mvc

I'm trying to figure out how ASP.NET internally validates that a cookie will allow the user to access the application.
CookieAuthenticationMiddleware will set .AspNet.Cookies with an encrypted value. After .NET successfully decrypts the cookie on a request, what validation occurs then?
Developing locally with IISExpress if I have an application (#1) that sets an authentication Cookie after the user logs in, and I create a complete new application (#2) also running on localhost, that is also using CookieAuthentication. When I access #2 it will read the cookie from #1 and allows the user to access the application as well.
I'm trying to understand what the limits are for cookie authentication.

There's not really any "validation" per se. The cookie's encrypted key is used to reference the user that should be "logged in". It works in a very similar way to sessions, where the session cookie holds an encrypted session id that the server can use to look up and restore the session via.
The encryption/decryption is based on the machine key, which either may be explicitly set in the Web.config or generated automatically by ASP.NET. Only applications that share the same machine key may decrypt the cookie, which is why it's so important to protect your machine key.
Anyways, there's two factors involved here. First, cookies are domain bound: only the domain or subdomains of the domain the cookie is set on will be given the cookie. This is handled by the client (i.e. browser). Your two applications currently are able to both see the cookie because they're both running on localhost. However, if you were to deploy one at foo.com and the other at bar.com, then they would no longer be able to see each other's cookies.
Second, the machine key is typically by server (unless you explicitly set it in the Web.config per app). As a result, sites running on the same machine can usually decrypt each other's cookies (assuming they see them in the first place, which again, is based on their domain).
It's not clear whether you're happy or not about this arrangement. If your goal is to segregate the two sites running locally, such that they don't share cookies, you have a couple of options.
You can explicitly set a different machine key for each site in their respective Web.config files. They'll still receive any cookies set by the other site, but they'll no longer be able to decrypt them, which basically results in them being ignored.
You can customize the auth cookie name. Instead of using the default cookie name you can make one .Site1.Auth and the other .Site2.Auth. Then, even though either site will also receive the cookie for the other site, it will simply ignore it, because it's not the auth cookie for it.
If, however, you're intending to rely on this behavior in production as well (i.e. you actually want logging into one site to log you into the other as well), then you'll need to explicitly set the machine key to the same value in both site's Web.config files. Additionally, you'll need to deploy them on the same domain, or at least subdomains of that domain. In the case of subdomains, you'll need to set the cookie domain to be the wildcard domain .mydomain.com for both. Then, you could have one at foo.mydomain.com and another at bar.mydomain.com, and they'd both see the cookie because it was set on .mydomain.com. If you leave it the default, set on the actual domain of the site, then bar.mydomain.com could not see a cookie set by foo.mydomain.com because that cookie would be explicitly set only for foo.mydomain.com.

The primary validations are encryption and expiration. If apps share an encryption context (e.g. machine key) then they can share auth cookies (providing other client side sharing rules like domains and paths are satisfied). So yes it's expected that two apps using IIS Express localhost on the same machine would share cookies by default.
The expiration is also embedded in the encrypted value so the client can't tamper with it.

Related

Adobe Analytics - Different domain for s_vi cookie

I'm working on a ecommerce site which uses both Data Insertion Api and javascript (AppMeasurment.js) to send data to Adobe collecting servers. I need to read the s_vi cookie value in order to send data from backend.
When I look a the requests in firefox, the s_vi cookie has a different domain than my domain (I'm testing on localhost), so I can't read it.
Any help is appreciated.
The s_vi cookie is set in a response from your Data Collection Server (e.g. 'metrics.yoursite.com'), so you can only see that cookie in a matching domain space (e.g. 'yoursite.com'.)
To test on localhost, you could try using Fiddler to map requests for 'yoursite.com' to your localhost (or machine name) so your browser will send the cookie with those requests.
By default, Adobe Analytics is implemented with 3rd party cookies, but because of the Same-Origin Policy, javascript can only read cookies that are set on the same domain as the page.
If you already have your own system in place for tracking visitors by an id, you can explicitly set s.visitorID and it will override the default id. If you go this route, then you don't need to read the cookie, as you already have the value exposed.
Alternatively, you can implement the Visitor ID Service which is a cross-domain 1st party cookie solution (Note: I have found that it does not work 100% cross-domain though, depending on how strict a visitor's browser settings are, particularly in IE). Because this is a first party cookie solution, you will then be able to read the cookie with javascript.

FormsAuthentication.SetAuthCookie vs FormsAuthentication.Encrypt

Question #1:
Is setAuthCookie any less safe than FormsAuthentication.Encrypt(ticketVariable)?
I mean if anyone tries to modify the cookie created by setAuthCookie, by modifying the username, I suppose that'll violate the authentication on subsequent calls?
Question #2:
for those using iphones and tablets to access the site, I suppose FormsAuthentication will fail? Given that I don't want to use cookieless option, is there another approach to make the site secure on both smart phones web browsers and ummm none-smartphone web browsers?
cheers
SetAuthCookie basically creates a new FormsAuthenticationTicket with the supplied username & persistence options, serializes it, FormsAuthentication.Encrypt()'s it, and sets it in the Response.Cookies collection. SetAuthCookie and GetAuthCookie both call FormsAuthentication.Encrypt indirectly.
On subsequent requests, the FormsAuthentiationModule handles the AuthenticateRequest event. If it sees a cookie (it may have expired), it attempts to decrypt it's value with the machineKey (it may have been tampered with) and deserialize it back into a FormsAuthenticationTicket (it may be corrupt). If none of that (bad stuff) happens, the ticket contains the username, issue date, expiration info, etc.. If the ticket hasn't expired, an IIdentity and IPrincipal are created and assigned to HttpContext.Current.User and Thread.CurrentThread.Principal. In .NET 4.5 and later (I think), this is Claims-based (ClaimsIdentity, ClaimsPrincipal). Prior to that, it was a (GenericPrincipal, FormsIdentity) I think.
Any tampering at all on the user side will cause the request to be treated as anonymous. It will fail to decrypt. The only things that would compromise this validation would be if the machineKey in web.config/machine.config somehow got into the hands of an attacker or if there was a bug in the framework code (search for Padding Oracle for a historical example of this).
Aside from that, the other thing to watch out for would be session hijacking. If someone steals your cookie on a public wifi for example, they can present it to the server and the server will behave as if it's you. This generally involves network traffic sniffing. For these reasons, best practice is to use SSL for your entire site and set the cookie to HTTP only and Secure (only presented over https connections) in web.config/system.web/authorization/forms. HTTP only means that it will not be available to client-side Javascript. HTTP Only and Secure effectively means HTTPS only. This will only work if you use SSL on your entire site.
FormsAuthentication will work fine on mobile web browsers. It simply requires the client to accept cookies. As far as I know, all mobile devices will allow this.

Delete Rails session cookies from Wordpress and vise versa

We are designing an application that will use Rails and Wordpress to interact with each other. We would like to have a universal logout where you could logout from either application and it would delete cookies from the other app. They will share the same host and toplevel domain. Is there a way to do this?
Access to a cookie is dependent on the domain of the server attempting to read the request -- and potentially the domain specified in the cookie. So assuming the domains match (e.g. www.example.com and www.example.com on both blog and Rails app) either should have access to a cookie set by the other.
If this is not the case (e.g. blog.example.com, www.example.com), you'll need to make sure when the cookie is set in either place, it's set for the entire domain (e.g. .example.com). But this doesn't help: while Rails can delete WP's cookie, and vice-versa, the method for creating (and using) them needs to be mutually understood.
So there's a twist here, since this is a session cookie; in this case, the cookie (which either app should have access to) is setting a value that is used and interpreted on the server side, where sessions are managed. WordPress and Rails both different methods and look for different cookies.
A solution (idea) would be to have one or the other subsystem catch incoming requests (most likely WP, and probably through some .htaccess RewriteRule, assuming you're using Apache) and create an intermediate cookie that the other could check that provides sufficient proof that the user has logged in correctly. WP's PHP for this is pretty good, and easily extended -- you just need to create some token that's a shared secret between the two apps (one of the values in wp-config.php such as LOGGED_IN_KEY might be a good option).
Maybe a solution would be to take the publicly available value from the WP cookie for username, and append the shared secret value and (in both systems) create an MD5 hash to store in a cookie. In this case, Rails' authentication would subordinate to WP's, so you would need to make sure Rails knew to delegate things like forgotten password, changed password, etc, to WP's mechanisms.
Obviously I am thinking aloud, but maybe this is a path to consider.
In any case, this is preferable to having both systems know how to trust the other's authentication.
Fiddling with cookie deletion appears to be dirty and error prone.
You might rather want to have a look at auth providers and the according plugins such as:
OAuth (WP - Rails; maybe make either side an OAuth provider)
CAS (WP - Rails)
LDAP (WP - Rails)
...
Maybe it's an option to switch from WP to one of Rail's CMS like:
Refinery CMS
Typo
...

How do I let a user sign in from a different domain on Authlogic?

[This is slightly different than a previous question about having multiple domains share the same cookie. It seemed like there wasn't an easy way to do that.]
I have a application at application.com. A customer has app.customer.com pointed at my site on Heroku, and I have everything set up so that it renders a specific version of app correctly. The issue is that I want a user at app.customer.com to be able to login. I believe authlogic is now setting the cookie on application.com, so while it verifies the credentials, no session on customer.com is ever created.
Since cookies cannot be shared across domains, you probably need to save an identifier in a database and also pass it through the url so when the client browser hits the new domain, it sends the token for the new domain session to see and match.
It should be a long cryptographically safe token, like a UUID to keep it from being guessed by attackers.
I'm not sure how the authlogic piece fits in though.

single sign on between Vbulletin and rails applications

we have a lot of users on a VBulletin forum. now i want write few more apps on rails for the same userbase. Until now all the authentication and session management is being taken care of by VBulletin. What is the best way to provide SSO for my users both onVBulletin and on the rails apps i am writing
I am working on single sign-on process with v Bulletin and custom made application. i can logged in at Vb using cookies. i can access all. but when access send "Private Message". it says
"
You have turned off private messages. You may not send private messages until you turn them on by editing your options.
"
is there all permission are set at "datasource" table?..
Thanks
master
Ideally your two sites are subdomains of a common domain (e.g. forum.example.com and rails.example.com), or share the same domain (www.example.com.) One of the sites would be the primary authenticator, and set a cookie (for .example.com in the case of the common parent domain [notice the . before example.com] or www.example.com in the case of the shared domain, so that both applications can access it), where the cookie contains:
the user ID
a salt (random value calculated at login time), and
a SHA-2 signature computed over the triplet (user ID + salt + a shared secret key), where the shared secret key is a secret string known by both sites.
Each site would be able to retrieve the user ID and salt from the cookie, then use the shared secret key (known only by the two applications) to calculate a SHA-2 signature that must match the SHA-2 signature stored in the cookie.
If the SHA-2 signatures match then you can assume that the user is authenticated, otherwise force the user to log in again.
The cookie must be destroyed when logging off.
The small print
To protect against session hijacking, all requests made over the two sites should be encrypted over SSL (use https.) If this is not possible, a hash based on the client's IP address as well as browser type and version (User-agent) should probably be calculated at login time and also be stored in the cookie. It should be re-checked against the client's IP address and user agent before serving each request. The hash-based approach is security through obscurity, and can be fooled; moreover, a user accessing the internet from behind a pool of proxies or using TOR may be kicked out by your system every time a different proxy or exit node (with a different IP address) forwards a request.

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