I'm trying to understand SQL Injection. It seems like people can get pretty creative. Which gets me wondering about my search-based rails webapp I'm making.
Suppose I just fed user-entered information directly into the "where" statement of my SQL query. How much damage could be done to my database by allowing this?
def self.search(search)
if search
includes(:hobbies, :addresses).where(search)
else
self.all
end
So basically, whatever the user types into the search bar on the home page gets fed straight into that 'where' statement.
An example of a valid 'search' would be:
"hobby LIKE ? OR (gender LIKE ? AND hobby LIKE ?)", "golf", "male", "polo"
Does the fact that it's limited to the context of a 'where' statement provide any sort of defense? Could they still somehow perform delete or create operations?
EDIT:
When I look at this tutorial, I don't see a straightforward way to perform a deletion or creation action out of the where clause. If my database contains no information that I'm not willing to display from a valid search result, and there's no such thing as user accounts or admin privileges, what's really the danger here?
I took this from another post here: Best way to go about sanitizing user input in rails
TL;DR
Regarding user input and queries: Make sure to always use the active record query methods (such as .where), and avoid passing parameters using string interpolation; pass them as hash parameter values, or as parameterized statements.
Regarding rendering potentially unsafe user-generated html / javascript content: As of Rails 3, html/javascript text is automatically properly escaped so that it appears as plain text on the page, rather than interpreted as html/javascript, so you don't need to explicitly sanitize (or use <%= h(potentially_unsafe_user_generated_content)%>
If I understand you correctly, you don't need to worry about sanitizing data in this manner, as long as you use the active record query methods correctly. For example:
Lets say our parameter map looks like this, as a result of a malicious user inputting the following string into the user_name field:
:user_name => "(select user_name from users limit 1)"
The bad way (don't do this):
Users.where("user_name = #{params[:id}") # string interpolation is bad here
The resulting query would look like:
SELECT users.* FROM users WHERE (user_name = (select user_name from users limit 1))
Direct string interpolation in this manner will place the literal contents of the parameter value with key :user_name into the query without sanitization. As you probably know, the malicious user's input is treated as plain 'ol SQL, and the danger is pretty clear.
The good way (Do this):
Users.where(id: params[:id]) # hash parameters
OR
Users.where("id = ?", params[:id]) # parameterized statement
The resulting query would look like:
SELECT users.* FROM users WHERE user_name = '(select user_name from users limit 1)'
So as you can see, Rails in fact sanitizes it for you, so long as you pass the parameter in as a hash, or method parameter (depending on which query method you're using).
The case for sanitization of data on creating new model records doesn't really apply, as the new or create methods are expecting a hash of values. Even if you attempt to inject unsafe SQL code into the hash, the values of the hash are treated as plain strings, for example:
User.create(:user_name=>"bobby tables); drop table users;")
Results in the query:
INSERT INTO users (user_name) VALUES ('bobby tables); drop table users;')
So, same situation as above.
I hope that helps. Let me know if I've missed or misunderstood anything.
Edit Regarding escaping html and javascript, the short version is that ERB "escapes" your string content for you so that it is treated as plain text. You can have it treated like html if you really want, by doing your_string_content.html_safe.
However, simply doing something like <%= your_string_content %> is perfectly safe. The content is treated as a string on the page. In fact, if you examine the DOM using Chrome Developer Tools or Firebug, you should in fact see quotes around that string.
Related
I want to do non-standard query with join based on the parameters.
For example I have 2 tables: a_examples and b_examples both with fields: field_x and field_y.
I want to join rows when both tables have the same values on field_x(or field_y).
Example query can looks like this:
AExample.joins('INNER JOIN b_examples ON b_examples.field_x = a_examples.field_x')
The problem occurs when I have field name based on parameter.
For example I have variable field_name and want to use it for query. I can do it like this:
AExample.joins("INNER JOIN b_examples ON b_examples.#{field_name} = a_examples.#{field_name}")
This query works, but is susceptible for sql injection.
For where clause we have special syntax with ? to avoid sql injection but there isnt any such thing for joins. How can I make this query safe?
Do not attempt this:
(explanation below)
You can use the ActiveRecord::Sanitization module and write something like the following, inside your ActiveRecord model:
AExample.joins("INNER JOIN b_examples ON b_examples.#{sanitize_sql(field_name)} = a_examples.#{sanitize_sql(field_name)}")
Or you can include the module somewhere else and use it there (e.g. your controller).
Do use this, instead: (included from another answer)
AExample.joins("INNER JOIN b_examples ON b_examples.#{ActiveRecord::Base.connection.quote_column_name(field_name)} = a_examples.#{ActiveRecord::Base.connection.quote_column_name(field_name)}")
It will raise an error if the column is not found, preventing malicious code from entering your query.
However I wouldn't do this in my app as it looks suspicious, other programers may not understand what is happening, it may be implemented wrong, solid testing should be included, it may have bugs and such. In your problem, you only need to construct two different queries, with that information I would write something like:
case dynamic_field
when 'field_x'
AExample.joins('INNER JOIN b_examples ON b_examples.field_x = a_examples.field_x')
when 'field_y'
AExample.joins('INNER JOIN b_examples ON b_examples.field_y = a_examples.field_y')
else
raise "Some suspicious parameter was sent!: #{dynamic_field}"
end
Or even write scopes on your model and avoid this code to be flying around.
With problems of this nature, as with encryption, try to find a workaround and avoid implementing your own solutions as much as possible.
EDIT:
The method sanitize_sql is intended to sanitize conditions for a WHERE clause (ActiveRecord::Sanitization):
Accepts an array or string of SQL conditions and sanitizes them into a valid SQL fragment for a WHERE clause.
It is not an option as you try to sanitize for an INNER JOIN, or an ON clause.
Note that the ActiveRecord::Sanitization module only has options for WHERE, SET, ORDER and LIKE clauses. I was unable to find a sanitization method for a column name, an INNER JOIN or an ON clause. Perhaps is a useful funcionality that should be added on Rails on further version.
Using sanitize_sql with a string passes it almost unfiltered, so if the field_name variable has some malicious code as:
"field_x = a_examples.field_x; DROP TABLE a_examples; --"
It will be included in your query, without any error being raised.
This solution is not safe, and is for reasons like these that we should avoid writing code of this nature. Perhaps you find something helpful with Arel or other gems, but I would strongly advice not to.
EDIT 2:
Added the working solution to escape a column name. It raises an error if malicious code is being entered, as the column with that name will not be found.
You can sanitize parameters using ActiveRecord::Base.connection.quote(string) or even .quote_column
I was reading up on SQL injection attacks from the Rails Guides and was wondering if the below line could be susceptible to a SQL Injection attack:
accounts.where("lower(name) LIKE '%#{params[:query].downcase}%'")
If I read and understand the guide correctly, could a user do something like
`'\''; DROP TABLE users;`
Would that drop my table?
------EDIT------
Same for these examples:
Account.where(id: account_id).first
current_user.actions.where(id: params[:clear_action_reminder]).first
edits.where.not(account_id: non_human_ids)
Rating.where(project_id: #project.id, account_id: current_user.id).first_or_initialize
These are of course application specific queries but because there is no ? in the query could these all potentially be disastrous?
Account.where("lower(name) LIKE '%#{params[:query].downcase}%'")
Yes, the above query is vulnerable.
Building your own string from user input may expose your application to injection attacks.
Instead of passing a string to the conditions option, you can pass an array to sanitize tainted strings like this:
query = params[:query].downcase
Account.where('lower(name) LIKE ?', "%#{query}%")
This will make your code safe & readable in complex queries. If #where is called with multiple arguments, these are treated as if they were passed as the elements of a single array. You can call with hash as well. Both array and hash are safe.
Your following queries are safe:
Account.where(id: account_id).first
current_user.actions.where(id: params[:clear_action_reminder]).first
Edit.where.not(account_id: non_human_ids)
Rating.where(project_id: #project.id, account_id: current_user.id).first_or_initialize
Adding to the same question from (HERE), I am planning to use hash instead of string as parameter. Say,
User.order(params[:column].to_sym => params[:direction].to_sym)
Where params[:column] and params[:direction] are passed from the page for sorting the table (Reference). I even added .to_sym to both parameters just so that it will be forced into a symbol instead of string just to be safe (although I am not sure if this is even necessary)
Now, I would just like to know if this approach is safe.
P.S. tried ransack gem, however I couldn't do nested queries. So I wrote my own customizable one.
I think this is at least still open for a Denail of Service attack.
http://brakemanscanner.org/docs/warning_types/denial_of_service/index.html
The reference is from a nice gem called brakeman which finds vunerable things in a rails application.
In general I would advise you to use #dmcnally's approach from the other issue you posted.
Here an example of what I did in my own projects:
SORT = { newest: { created_at: :desc },
cheapest: { price: :asc },
most_expensive: { price: :desc }
}.stringify_keys
And then use SORT[param[:sort]] to get the sort order. You can also do this by using two seperate hashes for direction and column like you supposed. If you use brakeman you will be able to have a little but of safety since it finds most things like that.
Symbols don't protect you from SQL injection, query parametrization protects you from SQL injection - and this only on the value side, not on the column name side. The thing to take from the other article is "not safe to use interpolated strings in column name when calling .order", not "not safe to use strings when calling .order",
your example defines ordering using a hash - that hash gets translated into a parametrized SQL query in AR, so it is safe as long as you sanitize the column name. One liberal way to do this is to:
raise "Unknown column name #{params[:column]}" unless YourModel.column_names.include?(params[:column])
PS What .to_sym does in your example is that it enables a third party to define a new symbol on the ruby vm. Symbols are never garbage collected so the attacker can send many different values so that your ruby processes hog the system memory - thus opening you to a ddos attack. The cast in the end does nothing because if you look here you'll notice your value gets cast into string anyway :)
There was a very similar question before but i still struggle.
Is it possible to build a query up in stages?
Let's say I have a search form with many text and select fields that may be chained with and/or or which could be blank.
So the sql statement should consist of several parts that are connected individually for each search.
I tried to create strings for every option and put them to a symbol? (i mean #options) and put that in the where clause (e.g. Product.where(#options) ). That works somehow but i have got troubles with this part: 'params[:query]' when it's in quotes. Either my sql statement says 'select products from products where (name like params[:query]') or if i try #{params[:query]} it says: select products from products (where 'name' like ''.)
So how can i chain different parts of a query?
I looking forward to your answers!
Never, ever, ever embed raw strings in your SQL. This is extremely bad form. You should always use the escaping mechanism provided by Rails or something equivalent to avoid ending up in serious trouble. Inserting content from params is very dangerous and should never be done as it only takes this to nuke your app: { :query => '\"-- DROP TABLE users;' }
Generally you use the helper methods provided by ActiveRecord to build up your query in stages:
scope = Product
if (params[:query].present?)
scope = scope.where([ 'name LIKE ?', "%#{params[:query]}%" ])
end
if (params[:example].present?)
scope = scope.where(:example => true)
end
#products = scope.all
You can build it up in stages like this, modifying the scope in-place each time, and then execute the final call to retrieve it. Generally that's when you use your paginator to split up the results.
It's okay to put pretty much anything in your options because it should be escaped by the time it hits the SQL phase, much as anything on the HTML side is escaped for you as well.
Don't confuse instance variables like #options with a symbol like :query. The two are very different things. Instance variables have the benefit of propagating to your view automatically, so they are often used extensively in controllers. Views should avoid modifying them whenever possible as a matter of style.
Suppose I've got a search box on a page in a Rails 3 app where you can search for a client by business name or city. In my controller's index method I do this:
if params[:search]
#clients = Client.where("clients.business_name LIKE :business_name OR clients.city = :city", :business_name => "%#{params[:search]}%", :city => params[:search])
Those hash values get substituted into the SQL and surrounded in quotes. If my input into the search box includes quotes or other dangerous characters, I'll see them being escaped in the development log, like:
...WHERE (clients.business_name LIKE '%Something\' DROP TABLE Foo%'...
Or
...WHERE... OR clients.city = 'Something OR 1=1')
So, since the OR 1=1 is inside the quotes Rails adds, it just produces no match for the city name, and since the quote in the DROP TABLE attempt is escaped, it also produces no match for the business name.
This isn't using actual prepared statements, where the query is sent to the database first without the search values filled in, then subsequently, the search values are sent to the database to fill in. I thought that was the safest approach, but Rails doesn't do it; I think this is because it's not available in all databases and implementations vary.
Is this open to SQL injection in some way? I don't see it, but again, it's not using prepared statements, so I wonder. If there's a vulnerability, how could I do this more safely?
No, there's not a SQL injection vulnerability here. ActiveRecord will call connection.quote on the values of the hash that you passed in as the second parameter to where, so you are safe.
The only potential SQL injection point I could think of would be if there were some undiscovered bug in connection.quote, which is pretty unlikely.